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Introduction
The great financial crisis of the years 2007-2009 was triggered by increasing
delinquencies in the US subprime mortgage market but soon, through the channels
of derivative instruments and asset-backed securities, propagated worldwide to the
banking sector. A significant number of banks were bailed out by taxpayer money
and, in the fall of 2008, the interbank market nearly came to a halt. The collapse
of confidence in the credit market had severe effects in the real economy, which
suffered the first worldwide recession since the 1930s.
The great financial crisis was indeed preceded by a global credit bubble enabled
by the globalization of banking and a period of unusually low interest rates and
risk spreads; data show that since 2000 the combined public and private debt
grew rapidly in most mature economies, see McKinsey Global Institute (2010).
Advanced economies are now in a deleveraging phase where both private and public
sectors are trying to reduce their debt levels. In particular, households are repairing
their balance sheets after years of credit-funded consumption expenditures and
mortgage-financed real estate boom. Governments are adopting tight fiscal policies
to reduce the debt burden, accumulated during the crisis because of banks’ bailout
and lower tax revenues. Historical data analysis shows that a major financial crisis
is nearly always followed by long period of deleveraging and that historically
deleveraging episodes exert a significant drag on GDP growth, see McKinsey
Global Institute (2010).
It can then be argued that the boom-bust credit cycle of the 2000s has played
a significant role in the developments of the great financial crisis (Keen, 2009)
and that is still playing a central role in shaping the future prospects of developed
economies, which are now on the track of a slow but uncertain recovery. Despite
this, and despite the prominence of debt in discussions about current economic
difficulties, perhaps surprisingly, it is quite common to abstract from debt in most
mainstream economic modelling, as for the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) models (De Grauwe, 2010) currently adopted by major central banks and
policy makers.
A recent pioneering attempt to include debt in a DSGE framework has been
done by Eggertsson and Krugman (2010). Indeed, the focus on debt and generally
on credit and its influence on economic activity is not new, and one of the first most
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notable example is actually the debt-deflation theory of the Great Depression by
Fisher (1933). In the post WWII mainstream economics, however, the insights by
Fisher were not taken into account and only the concept of insufficient aggregate
demand was incorporated in the so-called neo-classical synthesis of the 50s and
60s (Patinkin, 1965). Later on, the rational expectation revolution (Lucas, 1972)
and the real business cycle theory (Kydland and Prescott, 1982) of the 70s and the
80s, by taking to the extreme the Walrasian paradigm of money neutrality, even
neglected the relevance of monetary variables in the economy and therefore the
importance of credit. Years before, the monetary theory by Friedman and Schwartz
(1963) was in this respect a notable exception by linking monetary aggregates with
business cycles, even if no consideration about credit was present.
On the other hand, among the so-called post-keynesians, credit and money were
regarded as central in the functioning of the economy. The most prominent scholar
in this respect was Hyman Minsky who proposed theories explaining endogenous
speculative investment bubbles as prosperous phases of the economy when corpo-
rate cash flow rises beyond what is needed to pay off debt and speculative euphoria
develops, but soon thereafter debts exceed what borrowers can pay off from their
incoming revenues, which in turn produces a financial crisis (Minsky, 1986). As
a result of such speculative borrowing bubbles, banks and lenders tighten credit
availability, even to companies that can afford loans, and the economy subsequently
contracts. Beside the Minsky’s pioneering work, it is worth citing the endogenous
credit-money approach of the post-Keynesian tradition (Fontana, 2003; Arestis
and Sawyer, 2006; Kriesler and Lavoie, 2007). Contrary to the neoclassical syn-
thesis that considers money as an exogenous variable controlled by the central
bank through its provision of required reserves, to which a deposit multiplier is
applied to determine the quantity of privately-supplied bank deposits, the essence
of endogenous money theory is that in modern economies money is an intrinsically
worthless token of value whose stock is determined by the demand of bank credit
by the production or commercial sectors and can therefore expand and contract
regardless of government policy. Money is then essentially credit-money originated
by loans which are created from nothing as long as the borrower is credit-worthy
and some institutional constraints, such as the Basel II capital adequacy ratios,
are not violated. As the demand for loans by the private sector increases, banks
normally make more loans and create more banking deposits, without worrying
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about the quantity of reserves on hand, and the central bank usually accommodates
the demand of reserves at the short term interest rate, which is the only variable
that the monetary authorities can control. In this study, we fully endorse and follow
the endogenous credit-money approach.
More recently, the experience of the 1997 Asian financial crisis and of the Japan
lost decade has attracted the interest of a number of scholars towards the problem
of debt, balance sheets distress, and deleveraging (Krugman, 1999; Kiyotaki and
Moore, 2002; Werner, 2005; Koo, 2008). In particular, Koo (2008) has argued
that both Japan’s lost decade and the Great Depression were essentially caused
by balance-sheet distress, with large part of the economy unable to spend due to
excessive debt.
Finally, in the last few years, the experience of the great financial crisis has
made an increasing number of economists aware about the importance of debt and
leverage, and a number of studies have therefore appeared, see e.g. Geanakoplos
(2010); Adrian and Shin (2010).
The purpose of this paper is to study the problem of debt, leverage and delever-
aging by means of Eurace, a large-scale agent-based model and simulator of the
economy. Eurace represents a fully integrated macroeconomy consisting of three
economic spheres: the real sphere (consumption goods, investment goods, and
labour markets), the financial sphere (credit and financial markets), and the public
sector (Government and Central Bank). Following the agent-based approach of
Tesfatsion and Judd (2006), Eurace economic agents are characterized by bounded
rationality and adaptive behavior as well as pairwise interactions in decentralized
markets. The balance-sheet approach and the practice of stock flow consistency
checks are followed as model development paradigm, see Cincotti et al. (2010);
Teglio et al. (2010b, 2010a, 2011) for early accounts.
We argue that the agent-based approach is well suited to deal with a realistic
view of the economy, and is better able to take into account the complex pattern of
interactions in credit markets, like networks topologies, credit rationing, bankruptcy
waves and information cascade effects, which are very important issues behind
the causes and the unfolding of debt-induced recessions. Furthermore, despite
the attempts in the new so-called Keynesian literature (Bernanke and Gertler,
1990, 1995; Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1993; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Eggertsson
and Krugman, 2010) to incorporate debt and financial factors, the investment-
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finance linkage is still considered as a propagator mechanism of shocks which
are exogenous with respect to the economy. On the contrary, the agent-based
approach is able to emphasize the role of the investment-finance link not just as
a propagator of exogenous shocks but as the main source of financial instability
and business cycles, in line with Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis (Minsky,
1986; Fazzari et al., 2008))
A number of agent-based macroeconomic models have been developed in
the last few years with the aim to focus on credit and financial factors as key
driver of the business cycle, see e.g. Delli Gatti et al. (2005, 2009); Raberto et al.
(2008a); Chiarella and Di Guilmi (2011), but they still do not offer a complete
understanding of the economy as a set of interrelated markets, i.e. credit, financial,
labor, consumption and capital goods. Conversely, the Eurace model is grounded
on a complete integration of all these interrelated markets, and therefore represents
a truly innovative tool for the study of economics.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 a description of the main
features of the model is given. The following sections focus on the Eurace model
detail. In particular, Section 2 describes the production sector of Eurace, Section 3
presents the households, and Section 4 the banking sector. The government and the
central bank are described in Sections 5 and 6, respectively. Results are presented
and analyzed in Section 7.
1 A general overview of the Eurace model
Eurace is a macroeconomic model and simulator which is under development
since 2006 when the project started within a EU-funded research grant under the
sixth framework programme. The aim of Eurace is the design and implementation
of an agent-based macroeconomic simulation platform able to integrate different
sectors and markets, in particular, goods markets, labor markets, financial mar-
kets and credit markets. The Eurace project proposes an innovative approach to
macroeconomic modelling and economic policy design according to the new field
of agent-based computational economics, see e.g. the review by Tesfatsion and
Judd (2006). The simulator and the economic model have been constantly evolving
since the start of the Eurace project in 2006.
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The Eurace model and simulator is a fully-specified agent-based model of a
complete economy. Eurace is dynamically complete, that is, it specifies all real
and financial stocks and flows and allows to aggregate upward from the micro-
specifications to the macroeconomic variables of interest. In the modelling of
agent decision processes, Eurace follows the usual and realistic assumptions of
agent-based economics about bounded rationality, limited information gathering
and storage capacities, and limited computational capabilities of economic agents.
These assumptions lead us to use simple heuristics to model the agents’ behaviour,
derived from the management literature for firms, and from experimental and
behavioural economics for consumers/investors. We also make use of experimental
evidence from the psychological literature on decision making. The rules used by
the agents are simple but not necessarily fixed. Their parameters can be subject
to learning, and thus adapted to a changing economic environment. Here we can
make a distinction between adaptive agents and learning agents: the first use simple
stimulus-response behaviour to only adapt their response to their environment,
while the last use a conscious effort to learn about the underlying structure of their
environment.
The modelling of the market protocols is empirically inspired by real-world
markets. The consumption goods market is decentralized and characterized by
one-to-one interactions between firms and consumers. This is a simple form to
model localized markets with potential rationing on both sides. Households go
shopping on a weekly basis. In particular, market protocols capture important
market frictions based on problems of search, matching and expectation formation
in turbulent environments that are present in real world labour and goods markets.
The labour market functions by way of a local search-and-matching protocol that
likewise resembles a real world job search by unemployed workers. For the artifi-
cial financial market we model a real-world market protocol: the clearinghouse.
Government bonds are usually sold by auction. For the credit market we use a
firm-bank network interaction mechanism. This reflects how real-world firms
appear to manage their credit lines as comes out from the empirical data that have
been examined concerning firm-bank network interactions.
In the Eurace model, a double-entry balance sheet with a detailed account of
all monetary and real assets as well as monetary liabilities is defined for each agent
(see Cincotti et al. (2010) for more details). Monetary and real flows, given by
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agents’ behaviors and interactions, e.g. market transactions, determine the period
by period balance sheet dynamics. Stock-flow consistency checks have then been
done at the aggregate level to verify that all monetary and real flows are accounted
for, and that all changes to stock variables are consistent with these flows. This
provides us with a solid and economically well-founded methodology to test the
consistency of the model.
The choice of time scales for the agents’ decision making has been made in
order to reflect the real time scales in economic activities. The agents’ financial de-
cisions are made on a shorter time scale (day) than the economic decision making,
e.g., consumption and production, where the proper time horizon can be a week,
a month, or a quarter. In reality, most human decision-making and interaction
is asynchronous, due to the autonomous decisions of the agents. We model this
asynchronous decision making by letting agents have different activation days.
This means that on a single market different agents are active on different days.
Thus, who interacts with whom changes from day to day. Some activities, how-
ever, are synchronized. This is in particular the case when they are institutionally
initiated as, for instance, yearly tax payments, or monthly wage payments. We use
synchronous decision making/interactions whenever it reflects the reality.
One of the main goals of EURACE is to analyze how far qualitative properties
of the phenomena arising in economies with interacting heterogeneous agents
change as the number of involved agents goes up. This is a research topic that
has been to a large extent ignored in previous work in agent-based computational
economics. Based on this goal, the implementation of the Eurace platform is
designed to be scalable to a large number of agents.
The Eurace model has been implemented in FLAME1 (Flexible Large-scale
Agent-based Modelling Environment). The FLAME framework is specifically
designed to provide a formal and very flexible approach to agent-based modelling
and enables the creation of agent-based models that can be run on high performance
computers. The framework is based on the extended finite state machine theory
(Xmachine) which is particularly suited for writing AB models of large complex
systems. The agents are modelled as communicating X-machines allowing them
to communicate through messages being sent to each other as designed by the
1 http://www.flame.ac.uk/
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modeller. This information is automatically read by the FLAME framework and
generates a simulation program which enables these models to be parallelized
efficiently over parallel computers.
2 The production sector
2.1 General features
Two types of producers are considered in the Eurace model: capital goods producers
and consumption goods producers. Capital goods producers employ energy and
raw materials to produce on demand capital goods. Consumption goods producers
use capital goods and labor to produce homogenous consumption goods that will
be sold to households. Contrary to consumption goods producers, capital goods
producers do not have production inventories as well as financing needs because of
the production on demand and the variable production factors employed. Capital
goods producers can be represented as stylized agents with both real and financial
inputs and output. Conversely, consumption goods producers are much more
complex agents characterized by both flows and stocks (e.g., inventories, physical
capital, etc...) and will be described in details in the following.
2.2 Consumption goods producer (firms)
Consumption goods producers, henceforth firms, are the bulk of the production
sector in the Eurace model. They employ labor and capital goods to produce
consumption goods by means of a Cobb-Douglas technology. Quantity and price
decisions are based on standard inventory planning and mark-up pricing rules.
Firms ask for loans to the banking system in order to finance their production
plans and to fulfill their payments commitments, i.e., taxes, dividends, interests,
and loan repayments. If rationed in the credit market, firms issue new shares
to raise the required money in the equity market. Production, investment and
financing decisions are taken, processed and completed by firms once a month at
their assigned activation day. Activations days are different and specific to any
firm.
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Assets Liabilities
M f : liquidity deposited at a given bank D f = ∑b∈{banks}D
f
b : total debt
I f : inventories (sum of outstanding loans)
K f : physical capital E f : equity
Table 1: Balance sheet snapshot of firm f .
Table 1 presents the typical balance sheet of a firm f at a given business
day. Liquidity M f and inventories I f are updated daily following firms’ cash
flows and sales, while physical capital K f is updated once a month following
capital accumulation due to investments and capital depreciation. Debt D f is also
computed once a month (at the same day of the capital investment decision, i.e., at
the activation day) following the outcomes in the credit market, i.e., borrowing of
new loans and repayment of old loans. Equity E f is also updated once a month at
the activation day as residual according to the usual accounting rule:
E f = M f + pCI f + pKK f − ∑
b∈{banks}
D fb (1)
where pC is the monthly consumption goods price index and pK is the price of
capital goods, both referred to the calendar month. A business month is defined by
a set of n business days, henceforth simply days, and any activation day sets the
starts of a business month which is specific for any firm and does not correspond
to calendar months, which have an equal duration of n days but start at days 1, n
+1, 2n +1, etc....
Production, investments and financing needs
Let us consider that firm f has made its production plan decision at the activation
day which sets the beginning of business month τ . Suppose that firm’s f production
plan2 consists in producing a quantity q̂ fτ of consumption goods and setting the
new sale price to p fτ . The new production should be sold during month τ , along
2 Planned, desired or expected amounts of economic variables, such as production, capital and
investments, will be denoted by the hat symbol to distinguish them from realized amounts that will
depend on market and simulation outcomes. The production function is described in Eq. 10
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with the production unsold in the previous months and accumulated in inventories
stock I f . Given the production plan q̂ fτ , firm f determines the amount of labor
N̂ fτ and capital K̂
f
τ needed to fulfill it. If the amount of needed physical capital is
higher then the present endowment of physical capital, i.e, if K̂ fτ > (1− ε)K fτ−1,
where K fτ−1 is the capital endowment of firm f at the end of the previous business
month and ε is the monthly capital depreciation rate, then the firm demands an
investment Î fτ = K̂
f
τ − (1− ε)K fτ−1 in new physical capital to fill the gap.
Besides production, pricing and investment decisions, each firm computes at
the same activation day the amount of liquidity needed to finance the production
and investment plans as well as the scheduled financial payments. In particular,
scheduled financial payments consist in the interest bill B fτ , i.e., the interest pay-
ments on the amount of outstanding debt, the debt installments, taxes T fτ and the
dividends payout. The interest bill B fτ is given by:
B fτ =∑
i
ri
12
λ˜ f ,iτ−1 , (2)
where λ˜ f ,iτ−1 is the amount of the i-th loan
3, received by firm f from any bank,
that has still to be repayed4, and ri is the yearly interest rate specific to loan i. B fτ
is a monthly interest bill and this explains the division by 12. The sum of debt
installments is given by ρ∑i λ˜
f ,i
τ−1 where ρ is the constant fraction of loans to be
repayed at any month. The tax bill is a constant fraction ξ of previous month gross
earnings (or gross profits) Π fτ−1, i.e., T
f
τ = ξΠ
f
τ−1, while the dividends payout
is a variable fraction of previous month net earnings (or net profits) Π fτ−1−T fτ .
In particular, the firm decides the planned per-share dividend d̂ fτ . Consequently,
the expected dividends payout is simply given by e f d̂ fτ where e f is the number of
outstanding equity shares of firm f . It is worth noting that both taxes and dividends
are set to zero in the case of negative gross earnings. Gross earning at sale month
3 It is worth noting that in this context it is necessary to distinguish λ˜ f ,i from D fb . D
f
b sums over
all the not yet paid back loans λ˜ f ,i received from bank b at a given point in time, where any loan is
characterized in principle by a different rate ri. This is the reason why we need a different notation
in Eq. 2. We use the index i instead of b because the same bank can apply different rates to different
firms and/or at different times.
4 The tilde used in the notation denotes that it is the part not yet repaid of the original loan λ f ,i.
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τ−1 are given by revenues R fτ−1, earned during the month, minus labor costs and
the interest bill B fτ−1. Revenues are computed as R
f
τ−1 = p
f
τ−1q
f
τ−1 where q
f
τ−1 is
the quantity sold during the previous month and p fτ−1 the sale price. Labor costs
are given by wτ−1N
f
τ−1 where wτ−1 is the money wage and N
f
τ−1 the number of
employees of firm f during month τ−1. The total foreseen liquidity needs L fτ of
firm f at month τ are therefore given by summing all scheduled financial payments,
the foreseen production and investment costs referred to the production planned
for month τ . Costs include the foreseen labor costs, i.e., wτ N̂ fτ , where Nˆ
f
τ is the
labor demand, and investments costs pkτIˆ
f
τ . It is worth noting that effective costs
may be lower than the foreseen ones, because N fτ ≤ N̂ fτ due to possible rationing of
firm f in the labor market and thus its inability to hire all the planned employees.
On the contrary, given that we stipulate a production on demand for capital goods
producers, effective investments Iˆ fτ should be expected to be always equal to
planned ones, unless the firm f is unable to collect the necessary liquidity needs
L fτ . The foreseen liquidity needs are then given by:
L fτ = B
f
τ +T
f
τ +ρ∑
i
λ˜ f ,iτ−1+ e
f d̂ fτ +wτ N̂
f
τ + pKτ Î
f
τ . (3)
Finally, it is worth noting that the interest bill, taxes and loans repayments are
determined out of the firm control, while dividends, labor and investments costs,
can be scaled down in the case the firm is unable to raise the necessary monetary
resources in the credit market or in the stock market.
Details on the firms’ decision process about production, pricing, factor demand,
and financing will be given in the next paragraphs.
Production and price decision
Each firm keeps a stock of its unsold production as inventories I f . Once every
business month, during its activation day, the firm checks if its stock needs to be
refilled. According to the approach of using standard managerial methods wherever
it is applicable, a standard inventory rule (Silver et al. (1998)) for managing the
stock holding is employed.
Let us suppose that at activation day t, which sets the start of business month τ ,
firm f has an inventories stock I ft and expects a demand Q̂
f
τ for the business month
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τ . Standard results from inventory theory suggest that the firm should choose to
produce a quantity q˜ fτ for month τ given by:
q˜ fτ =
{
0 if I ft ≥ Q̂ fτ
Q̂ fτ − I ft if I ft < Q̂ fτ .
(4)
Expected demand Q̂ fτ is estimated using a linear regression based on previous
sales. To avoid excessive oscillations from one month to the other of the planned
production quantity, q̂ fτ is smoothed according to the following rule:
q̂ fτ = ω q˜
f
τ +(1−ω) 1T
τ−1
∑
k=τ−T
q fk . (5)
where q fk is the quantity produced in the previous T months. On this account, the
consumption goods producer shows some inertia in adapting the actual production
quantity to the desired quantity. As discussed in more detail below, the realized
production volume q fτ can deviate from the planned output q̂
f
τ due to rationing on
the factor markets.
Production times of consumption goods are not explicitly taken into account
and the produced quantities are delivered on the same day when production takes
place. The local stock level is therefore updated accordingly.
Consumption good producers set prices according to a mark-up pricing rule,
which recent empirical analysis (Fabiani et al. (2006)) has showed to be commonly
used by European firms. In particular, the new sale price p fτ at month τ is set
considering a fixed markup µ on unit costs c fτ as follows:
p fτ = (1+µ)c
f
τ , (6)
where unit costs c fτ are calculated as a weighted average of the unit costs c¯
f
τ , related
to production q fτ that took place in the last period τ , and the unit costs c
f
τ−1 which
are related to the costs of producing old goods (in previous periods) that are still
unsold and stocked in the inventories I ft , i.e.,
c fτ =
c¯ fτ q
f
τ + c
f
τ−1 I
f
t
q fτ + I
f
t
. (7)
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Present production unit costs c¯ fτ are given by the sum of labor costs wτN
f
τ , the
interest bill B fτ and the cost of capital depreciation ξ pKτ K
f
τ−1, all divided by the
present production amount q fτ , i.e.,
c¯ fτ =
wτN
f
τ +B
f
τ +ξ pKτ K
f
τ−1
q fτ
. (8)
Factors demand
The production technology in the consumption goods sector is represented by
a Cobb-Douglas type production function with complementarities between the
quality of the investment good and the specific skills of employees for using that
type of technology. See Dawid et al. (2008, 2009) for details about this approach.
Every worker v has a level of general skills bv ∈ {1, ..., bmax} and a level
of specific skills bˆvt . The specific skills of worker v indicate how efficiently the
corresponding technology is exploited by the individual worker. Building up
those specific skills depends on collecting experience by using the technology
in the production process. The shape of the evolution of productivity follows a
concave curve, the so-called learning curve, when the organizational productivity
is recorded after implementing a new production method or introducing a new
good. Concavity in this context means that the productivity rises with proceeding
use of the production method or production of the new good, but this increase
emerges at a decreasing rate. We transfer this pattern of organizational learning
on the individual level and assume that the development of individual productivity
follows a learning curve. The specific skills are updated once in each production
cycle of one month. Further, we assume that updating takes place at the end of the
cycle.
A crucial assumption is the positive relationship between the general skills bv of
a worker and his ability to utilize his experiences. Building up worker’s technology
specific skills depends on a worker’s level of general skills, i.e. his education and
the other general abilities which are not directly linked to the particular technology.
Taking the relevance of the general skill level into account the specific skills of a
worker v for technology j is assumed to evolve according to
b¯vτ = b¯
v
τ−1+χ(b
v)
(
A fτ−1−bvτ−1
)
, (9)
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where we denote with A fτ−1 the average quality of the capital stock of firm f where
worker v is employed. The function χ is increasing in the general skill level of
the worker. Note that this formulation captures the fact that in the absence of
technology improvements marginal learning curve effects per time unit decrease
as experience is accumulated and the specific skills of the worker approaches the
current technological frontier.
Factor productivity is determined by the minimum of the average quality of
physical capital and the average level of relevant specific skills of the workers.
Capital and labor input is substitutable with a constant elasticity and we assume
constant returns to scale. Accordingly, output for a consumption goods producer is
given by
q fτ = min[B
f
τ , A
f
τ ] (N
f
τ )α(K
f
τ )β , (10)
where B fτ denotes the average specific skill level in firms and α+β = 1.
Given the planned production quantity q̂ fτ set according to Eq. 5 and the
available Cobb-Douglas technology, firms have to decide the desired amount of
both capital K̂ fτ and labor N̂
f
τ to fulfill their production plans. The choice is made
according to the standard rule of cost minimization given a production goal. The
solution is the labor and capital amounts at which the marginal rate of substitution
between the two factors equates the ratio of their costs, i.e.,
α K̂ fτ
β N̂ fτ
=
w fτ
c fK,τ
(11)
where w fτ is the average wage currently paid by the firm to its employees and c
f
K,τ
is the average cost of capital computed as the sum of the present average monthly
loan rate r¯ fτ for the firm with the monthly depreciation rate ξ , all multiplied by the
present unit cost of capital pKτ , i.e.,
c fK,τ = (r¯+ξ ) p
K
τ . (12)
It is worth noting that r¯ fτ is computed as a weighted average of firm f loan rate,
where the weights are given by the amount of every loan.
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Taking into account the planned production quantity q̂ fτ , Eq. 11 in conjunction
with the production function defined by Eq. 10, where α+β = 1, yields the desired
demands for capital and labor:
K̂ fτ =
(
β w fτ
α c fK,τ
)α
q̂ fτ
min[B fτ , A
f
τ ]
(13)
N̂ fτ =
(
α c fK,τ
β w fτ
)β
q̂ fτ
min[B fτ , A
f
τ ]
(14)
If the desired capital amount is lower than the available capital, considering
depreciation, i.e., if K̂ fτ < (1−ξ )K fτ−1, then all the amount of capital (1−ξ )K fτ−1
available at month τ should be used, because its cost is always paid. The desired
amount of labor should be recomputed considering the present capital endowment
by using Eq. 11.
Finally, given the supposed technological constraint, a maximum increase of
physical capital κ is foreseen, i.e, if K̂ fτ > (1+κ)K
f
τ−1 then K̂
f
τ = (1+κ)K
f
τ−1.
The monthly realized operating profit of a consumption goods producer is the
difference of sales revenues during the previous period and production costs given
by the wage bill, the interest bill and the cost of capital depreciation. Wages for the
full month are paid to all workers at the day when the firm updates its labor force.
Investment goods are paid at the day when they are delivered.
Financing
According to the pecking-order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984), any firm f meets
its liquidity needs first by using its internal liquid resources M fτ , i.e., the cash
account deposited at a given bank; then, if M fτ < L
f
τ , the firm asks for a loan of
amount ` fτ = L
f
τ −M fτ to the banking system in order to be able to cover entirely its
foreseen payments. Credit linkages between firm f and any bank b are defined by
a connectivity matrix which is randomly created whenever a firm enters the credit
market in search for funding. In order to take search costs as well as incomplete
information into account, each firm links with a limited number of banks, which
are chosen in a random way.
www.economics-ejournal.org 15
conomics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal
Firms have to reveal to the linked banks information about their current equity
and debt levels, along with the amount of the loan requested ` fτ . Using this
information, each contacted bank b communicates the amount of money λ b, fτ it
is willing to lend to firm f , where λ b, fτ ≤ ` fτ . The amount λ b, fτ is determined
according to the decision rules outlined in the next section. Each contacted bank
calculates also the interest rate rb, fτ associated to the loan offer and communicates
it to the firm. Then the firm f agrees to get the loan from the bank applying the
lowest interest rate. On banks’ hand, they receive demands by firms sequentially
and deal with them in a “first come, first served” basis. As explained with more
detail in the following section, the firm can be credit rationed. If a firm can not
obtain a sufficient amount of credit from the bank that is offering the best interest
rate, the firm will ask credit to the bank offering the second best interest rate, until
the last connected bank of the list is reached. It is worth noting that, although the
individual firm asks loans from the bank with the lowest lending rate, the total
demand for loans does not depend directly on the interest rates of loans.
When firm f receives a loan from bank b, its cash account M fτ is increased by
the corresponding amount λ b, fτ . If the firm is not able to collect the needed credit
amount, i.e., if M fτ is still lower than L
f
τ , the firm has still the possibility to issue
new equity shares and sell them on the stock market. If the new shares are not sold
out, the firm enters a state called financial crisis. When a firm is in financial crisis,
we mainly distinguish two cases: if the firm’s available internal liquidity is still
sufficient to meet its committed financial payments, i.e., taxes, the debt instalment
and interests on debt, then these financial payments are executed and the dividend
payout and the production schedule are rearranged to take into account the reduced
available liquidity; otherwise, if the firm is unable to pay its financial commitments,
it goes into bankruptcy.
The model designs two types of bankruptcies, called insolvency and illiquidity
bankruptcies. The first type is when firm’s equity goes negative. The second type
is when the firm is unable to pay its financial commitments but still owns a positive
equity. The significative difference between the two types of bankruptcies is the
following: in case of insolvency bankruptcy, firm’s debt is restructured according
to a new target level of debt that has to be a fraction of firm’s total assets. The
exceeding part of the debt is written-off, i.e., the value of firm’s loans has to be
reduced.
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When a firm goes into bankruptcy, it fires all its employees, stopping production
for a period T fB . During this period, the firm tries to raise new capital in the financial
market in order to increase its liquidity.
2.3 Investment goods producers (IG firms)
There exists a single type of technology for investment goods. The investment
good is offered with infinite supply by investment goods producers which produce
on demand and have no inventories and financing needs. Energy and raw materials
are the only factor of production and are assumed to be imported from abroad.
The price of energy and raw materials is exogenously given. The price of capital
goods pK is a mark-up on energy prices. Profits of investment good producer are
distributed in equal shares among all households. Put differently, it is assumed
that all households own equal shares of capital goods producers and that shares
are not traded in the market. Therefore, the amount payed by consumption goods
producers for investment goods is partially (the part related to mark-up) channeled
back into the economy, while the part related to energy costs leaves the Eurace
economy.
3 Households
Households are simultaneously taking the roles of workers, consumers and financial
market traders. Each household can offer one unit of labor per month. The supply
of labor is inelastic, provided that the offered money wage is equal or higher than
the reservation wage. Reservation wages are heterogeneous among households and
are set to the latest received wage. If a household is unemployed, its reservation
wage is decreased by a constant monthly rate up to a lower bound equal to the
unemployment benefit. The labor market is decentralized and demand and supply
are matched on a pairwise basis. Firms seeking additional labor force post vacancies
with a related money wage. Unemployed households actively search for new jobs
by accessing to a random subset of the job vacancies and send job applications
to those firms offering wages equal or higher than their reservation wage. Job
applications are then ranked by firms according to applicants’ skills. Firms send
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Assets Liabilities
Mh: liquidity deposited at a given bank
nhg: government bonds holdings (none)
nhf , n
h
b: equity shares holdings of
firm f and bank b
Table 2: Household (H): balance sheet overview
job offers to selected applicants and, if the offer is accepted (any household may
receive more than one job offer and all offers are ranked by the household according
to the attached wages), the household/worker is hired. If a firm is unsuccessful in
hiring the number of worker required to fill its vacancies, it rises its wage offer
by a constant rate and a second (and final) iteration of job posts/applications and
offers among firms and households starts. If a firm is still unsuccessful in hiring the
required number of workers, it raises the wage offer again but it has to wait the next
month before entering the labor market again. Households’ total monthly income is
made by both labor and capital income. Gross labor income is given by the monthly
money wage wτ , payed by the employer, or by an unemployment benefit received
from the Government. The unemployment benefit is set at a fixed percentage η of
the last salary received. Households receive gross capital income from the equity
shares and government bonds held in their financial portfolio. Capital income is
given by dividends payed by firms on a monthly basis and by monthly government
bonds coupons. Households pay taxes on both labor and capital income. Labor and
capital income taxes are fixed percentages, ξHw and ξHK , respectively, of the gross
income. Households financial wealth is given by their assets portfolio and by the
liquidity deposited at a give bank. We stipulate that households have no liabilities.
Table 2 presents the typical balance sheet of a household.
Once households receive their labor income or unemployment benefit, at the
activation day of the firm where they are employed, they set the consumption budget
for the entire duration of the month. Saving-consumption decision is modelled
according to the theory of buffer-stock saving behaviour (Carroll, 2001; Deaton,
1992), which states that households consumption depends on a precautionary
saving motive, determined by a target level of wealth to income ratio. Consider
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household h receiving a gross money wage wτ at a particular day. Consider the
total net income of the household yhτ which includes the after tax money wage as
well as the net capital income earned during the previous month. Consider also the
financial wealth W hτ of household h at month τ which includes its assets portfolio,
valued at the most recent market prices, as well as liquidity. Following the buffer
stock theory of consumption, the household sets the budget for consumption chτ in
the following month as:
chτ = y¯
h+φH
(
W hτ − x · y¯h
)
, (15)
where y¯h is the average total net income of household h in the last ν months and x is
the target wealth to income ratio. The rationale of the rule is that if, for instance, the
present wealth to average income ratio is higher then the target one, i.e., W hτ /y¯
h > x,
then the household spends more then his or her average income in order reach the
target value. The parameter φH sets the adjustment speed.
Households can either invest their savings in the asset market, by trading stocks
or bonds, or can put them in a saving account that pays a fixed, risk-free interest rate.
The financial market operates on a daily basis and is characterized by a clearing
house mechanism for price formation which is based on the matching of the
demand and supply curves. Households portfolio allocation is modeled according
to a preference structure designed to take into account the psychological findings
emerged in the framework of behavioral finance and in particular of prospect theory
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). In particular, a key
prospect theory insight, i.e., the myopic loss aversion, is considered. Myopic loss
aversion depends on the limited foresight capabilities characterizing humans when
forming beliefs about financial returns (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995). Further details
about the belief formation and the preference structure are provided in Raberto
et al. (2008b); Teglio et al. (2009).
Once the monthly consumption budget chτ has been determined, on a weekly
basis household h draws a sample of the prices asked by different consumption
goods producers, therefore deciding which goods to buy. We assume that the
decision is random and that it follows a probability distribution given by a logit
model. This approach is standard in the marketing literature where logit models
are intended to represent the stochastic influence of factors not explicitly taken into
account. Denote by Fh the set of consumption goods producers whose goods have
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been sampled by household h in the given week. Since in our setup there are no
quality differences among consumption goods, the choice probability Probh, f of
good f ∈ Fh produced by the f -th consumption goods producer depends solely on
relative prices as follows:
Probh, f =
exp
(−Λ log p f )
∑ f∈Fh exp
(−Λ log p f ) , (16)
where Λ parameterizes the intensity of market competition, i.e., the bigger Λ is, the
more price sensitive probabilities are and the more competitive the market is. Once
the consumer has selected a particular consumption good producer f , he spends
his entire weekly consumption budget, i.e., chτ/4, for good f provided that the
inventory is sufficiently large. In case the consumer can not spend all his budget
on the product selected first, he spends as much as possible, removes that product
from the list Fh, updates the logit values and selects another product to spend the
remaining consumption budget there. If he is rationed again, he spends as much as
possible on the second selected product and rolls over the remaining budget to the
following week.
4 The banking sector
The primary purpose of the banking sector is to finance consumption goods pro-
ducers by means of bank loans. Any bank meets the demand for a loan from a
firm, provided that the risk-reward profile of the loan is considered acceptable by
the bank. The reward is given by the interest rate which is charged and the risk is
defined by the likelihood, estimated by banks, that the loan will default. Inspired
by present banking practice (Saunders and Allen (2010)), we stipulate that, given
the loan request amount ` f by a firm f , bank b calculates the probability pi f that
the firm will not be able to repay its debts as:
pi f = 1− exp
(
− D
f + ` f
E f
)
. (17)
The default probability pi f correctly increases with the firm’s leverage and
is used as a risk weight in computing the risk-weighted loan portfolio of banks,
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henceforth W b. D f and E f are firm’s debt and equity, respectively. According to
the computed credit worthiness of the firm, the bank informs it about the interest
rate that would be applied to the requested loan:
rb, f = rcb+ γbpi f , (18)
where rcb is the base interest rate set by the central bank and γbpi f is the risk spread
depending on the firm’s credit risk pi f . The parameter γb sets the spread sensitivity
to the credit worthiness of the firm. The central bank acts as the “lender of last
resort”, providing liquidity to the banking sector at the base interest rate rcb. It is
worth noting that banks lending rate does not depend on the expected demand for
loans but only on the evaluation of firm’s credit risk.
Banks can then lend money, provided that firms wish to take out new loans, and
that their regulatory capital requirements are fulfilled. Let us remark that granting
new loans inflates the balance sheet of the banking system because it generates
also new deposits5.
The model regulatory capital requirement are inspired by Basel II accords (BIS
(2006)) and state that the capital ratio of banks, given by the equity Eb divided by
the risk-weighted assets W b, has to be higher than a given threshold, defined as 1α ,
where α is the key policy parameter used in this study. Hence, if firm f asks for a
loan ` f , bank b supplies a credit amount λ b f determined as follows:
λ b, f =

` f if αEb ≥W b+pi f ` f ,
αEb−W b
pi f if W
b < αEb <W b+pi f ` f ,
0 if αEb ≤W b .
(19)
The value of risk-weighted assets W b is computed by the weighted sum of
outstanding loans of bank b where the weights are given by the default probability
(the default risk) of each loan defined in Eq. 17. Bank’s liquidity, i.e., Mb as in
Table 3, is an asset but its default risk shall be considered zero, therefore it does
not enter in the computation of W b.
5 When a loan is taken and spent, it creates a deposits in the bank account of the agent to whom
the payment is made. In particular, firms pay wages to workers and pay new physical capital to
investment firms, that are owned by households and redistribute net earnings to them.
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Assets Liabilities
Mb: liquidity Sb: standing facility
deposited at the central bank (debt to the central bank)
L b: bank’s loan portfolio Db: total (households’ and firms’) deposits
at the bank
Eb: equity
Table 3: Bank’s balance sheet
The parameter α can be interpreted as the leverage level banks are allowed to
have. Equations 19 state that bank b is available to satisfy entirely the loan demand
` f if it does not push W b above the Basel II threshold, set at α time the net worth
(equity) of the bank, otherwise the bank can satisfy the loan demand only partially
or even is not allowed to lend any money at all, and firm f is rationed in the credit
market. Thus, it can be argued that banks are quantity takers and price setters in
the loans market, with the policy constraint of a fixed capital adequacy ratio.
In order to better visualize the stock-flow accounts for banks, a typical balance
sheet of a bank is reported in Table 3. For any bank b, the stocks of total deposits
Db and loansL b are updated daily, according to the corresponding flows. Deposits
change according to payments (i.e. flows of money among private sector agents),
whereas banks loan portfolios are modified due to the granting of new loans and old
loan repayments. The stock of liquidity Mb of bank b is then updated accordingly,
following the standard accounting rule Mb = Sb+Db+Eb−L b. If Mb becomes
negative, Sb, i.e., the standing facility with the Central Bank, is increased to set
Mb = 0. If Mb is positive and the bank has a debt with central bank, i.e. Sb > 0, Sb
is partially or totally repaid for a maximum amount equal to Mb.
Finally, at the end of the trading day, both liquidity Mb and equity Eb are
updated in order to take into account money flows which regard bank b, i.e.,
interest revenues and expenses, taxes and dividends. The bank can choose if paying
or not dividends to shareholders, and this choice is crucial for driving its equity
dynamics. In particular, if a bank is subject to credit supply restriction due to a
low net worth compared to the risk-weighted assets portfolio, then it stops paying
dividends so to raise its equity capital and to increase the chance to match in the
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future the unmet credit demand. Finally, loans are extinguished in a predetermined
and fixed number of constant installments, nλ .
5 The Government
The Government is responsible for the fiscal and welfare policies. It collects taxes
on corporate profits, household labor and capital income, and sets the three cor-
responding tax rates. Taxes are collected on a monthly basis while tax rates are
revised yearly downward or upward by a given percentage tick in order to pursue a
zero budget deficit goal. Taxes constitute the revenues side of government budget.
Government expenses are made by unemployment benefits, households transfers
and the interest rates on the outstanding government debt, all payed on a monthly
basis. Unemployed benefits are set to a percentage of the last salary of the un-
employed worker. The government debt is made by infinitely-lived government
bonds that pay a fixed monthly coupon, determined by the nominal bond interest
rate and by the bond face value. The nominal bond interest rate is anchored with a
mark-up to the central bank base interest rate. Government bonds are owned by
households and traded in the financial market. Government deficit is financed by
issuing and selling in the market new infinitely-lived bonds. Government liquidity
Mg is deposited at the Central bank.
Table 4 presents a sketched balance sheet of the Government in Eurace.
Assets Liabilities
Mg: liquidity deposited at the long-term debt
central bank (ng: number of outstanding bonds)
Table 4: Government’s balance sheet
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6 The Central Bank
The Central Bank plays several important roles in the Eurace economy. It provides
a standing facility to grant liquidity in infinite supply to commercial banks, when
they are in short supply, and sets the base interest rate (or policy rate), which is the
the cost of liquidity provided to banks and the lowest reference value considered by
banks when setting interest rates of loans to firms. It is worth noting that there is no
interbank market in the Eurace model and that the central bank is the only provider
of liquidity to banks, alongside of course depositors, i.e. households and firms. This
critical role is actually performed by central banks also in real economies and the
ongoing global financial crisis started in 2007 has showed its relevance. The central
bank in Eurace always accommodates any liquidity request by commercial banks
as it usually applies in real world operations and is recognized by the endogenous
money theory, i.e. the theoretical framework we refer for credit market modeling
(see the Introduction and references therein). Therefore, commercial banks deal
with liquidity excess or shortage by depositing or withdrawing money at the central
bank. Without a supplier of liquidity of last resort, the observed credit crunch and
the consequent the fall of production and employment would have been probably
more severe.
Furthermore, the Central Bank may pursue an unconventional monetary policy,
named quantity easing, consisting in buying Government bonds directly in the
market, easing the funding conditions for the budgetary authorities. Table 5 shows
the typical balance sheet of a Central Bank.
In this paper, the central bank does not follow a specific monetary policy but
simply updates, with monthly frequency, the yearly base interest rate rcbτ in order
to fill the gap with inflation. If pimτ is the monthly inflation rate at month τ ,
rcbτ = max
(
rcbτ−1+
(
pimτ −
rcbτ−1
12
)
,rcbmin
)
. (20)
This rule connects the policy rate with the inflation rate, avoiding economic
distortions that can rise when the gap between interest rates and inflation is too big
(rcbmin is the minimum value for policy rate). The policy rate is adjusted monthly
according to its gap with inflation, calculated on a monthly base. The logic is
that inflation erodes the value of money over the term of a loan, so the central
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Assets Liabilities
nCBg : government bonds (QE) outstanding fiat money
MCB: liquidity MCBg : governments liquidity
LCBb : loans to banks (standing facility) M
CB
b : banks reserves
Gold ECB: equity
Table 5: Central Bank’s balance sheet
bank increases the interest rate to compensate for that loss (see Section 4 to have a
complete picture on loan rates).
The choice has been to keep the central bank “passive” in order to understand,
ceteris paribus, the effects of debt on our artificial economy. How the central bank
could handle economies’ debt is another story, that we are not telling in this paper.
7 Analysis of results
Computational experiments have been performed in a simulation setting character-
ized by 2,000 households, 20 consumption goods producers, 3 banks, 1 investment
goods producer, 1 government, and 1 central bank. In order to test model’s scal-
ing properties, we present an additional set of simulations performed with 5000
households, 50 firms, 7 banks, 1 investment goods producer, 1 government, and 1
central bank. The experiments consist in running several simulations of the Eurace
model, varying the values of banks’ leverage and observing the macroeconomic
implications in the artificial economy. Values of leverage α have been set in the
range from 5 to 9, where α = 5 corresponds to the case of the tightest capital re-
quirement and α = 9 to the most permissive case. The duration of each simulation
is set to 240 months (20 years).
Initial conditions have been chosen in order to keep realistic proportions be-
tween the different items of agents’ balance sheets, and to correctly size stocks and
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flows dimensions. For example, the debt-to-equity ratio of firms is initialized at 2,
which is a realistic value for industrial companies. Risk (weighted) assets to equity
ratio for banks is set to 5. The wealth-to-income ratio for households is set to 15,
with 40% of households wealth allocated into banks deposits, and the remaining
60% into financial assets. The debt-to-GDP ratio is around 85%, which is in line
with the Eurozone.
In the following sections results are presented from a qualitative and quantita-
tive point of view, with the effort to examine and disclose the economic mechanisms
that can explain the obtained results. For any parameters’ setting (i.e. any value of
α), several tables report the ensemble averages of the values of relevant economic
variables. Ensemble averages have been computed over 15 different random seeds;
the relatively low standard errors, as reported in the tables, indicate that the simula-
tion results are stable and that increasing further the number of seeds would not
provide new meaningful information. Given a probability distribution, different
seeds produce different realizations that affect initial conditions concerning behav-
ioral aspects of individual agents, but balance sheet entries remain constant in the
initialization phase and related by the same realistic proportions.
The figures in the Appendix present the time series of the main economic
variables referred to a given seed for three different values of α , i.e., 5, 7 and 9.
7.1 Reasoned assessment of simulation outcomes
Figure 1 clearly shows that the central bank interest rate, as stated in Eq. 20, targets
the inflation rate. It is important to stress that our aim here is not to test any mone-
tary policy but to understand the effect of debt on the Eurace artificial economy. In
this perspective, the central bank interest rate rule is a sort of minimal adjustment
that avoids major distortions as having high inflation and low interest rates, that
would represent a free lunch for indebted firms. We remind that banks loan rates
are set adding a mark-up on the central bank rate, that varies according to firm’s
riskiness, as shown in Section 4. In Figure 1 it is shown that cycles on inflation
drive real investments through the channel of interest rates. As stated in Section
2.2, investment decisions depend on the cost of capital, and thus investments are
anti-cyclical with respect to interest rates.
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Production (see Figure 2) is characterized by three stylized behaviors. A
long term growth due to capital accumulation, alternative periods of growth and
recession (business cycles), and sudden falls that are usually, but not always,
followed by correspondent recoveries. Looking at the same time to Figures 1, 2,
and 6, allows one to understand the nature of business cycles. In a period of full
employment there is a stronger pressure on wages, that tend to rise firms costs and
therefore prices, that are set according to a mark-up rule. A higher inflation drives
an increase of interest rates and investments costs, inducing a spiral that raises
prices again.
This mechanism goes on until the interest rate is sufficiently high to disincentive
investments. Here we have the peak of the business cycle, followed by a period of
lower investments that can lead to recession due to capital depreciation (look to
Section 2 to find model details). It is interesting to notice that inflation peaks are
characterized by a lag with respect to production peaks. In fact, full employment
usually persists for a while after the production peak, inducing a further growth
of wages and prices, see Figure 6. The reason of this evidence is that investments
contract too much, due to the high interest rates (see Figure 1 in the corresponding
time period) to adequately replace capital depreciation. Without new investments,
the endowment of physical capital declines, then also production declines even in a
persisting full employment scenario. In the last part of the cycle, the decrease of
inflation affects interest rates and firms start again to invest more, raising production
and labor demand, thus affecting wages and prices, and closing the cycle.
Figure 2 clearly shows that output is affected also by sudden falls that can be
very dangerous for the economic system. The case of high leverage (α = 9) is an
example of a critical collapse of production. A quantitative analysis of this falls
will be presented later in the paper, using tables with average values of different
simulation seeds for statistical robustness. Here we want to stress the qualitative
mechanism that emerges from the model, trying to explain the rationale behind
the presented results. In order to do that, we focus on what happens in the credit
market, and in particular on the effects of firms debt load. Let us comment, first,
the case of high leverage (α = 9).
Total loans, represented in Figure 3, show a cyclical trend which is very similar
to business cycles in production. This is due to the fact that firms finance their
production plan mainly by asking loans to banks (they can issue new shares if
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rationed in the credit market), and therefore an increase of total credit is generally
associated with economic growth. Figure 4 shows the median value of two indi-
cators of firms financial stability, i.e, debt over equity and interest expenses over
revenues. When total credit and production are growing, interest over revenues is
decreasing, firstly because revenues are obviously growing, and secondly because
the higher debt burden affects firms in the next 24 months, when they will have to
pay interests for the borrowed loans. The more critical period for the productive
sector is after a production peak, when a recession starts and interest expenses are
still very high. In these periods interest over revenues is very high and firms are
financially fragile. Some firm with low revenues can go into bankruptcy and, if the
economic system is also structurally fragile, the result can be a bankruptcies chain
with disastrous consequences.
Let us explain what happens in the case of high leverage (α = 9). From month
130, that corresponds to a production peak, it starts a moderate recession. Firms
debt over equity is already high, while interest expenses raise quickly over revenues.
Before month 168 we still are in recession and the financial fragility indicators
of Figure 4 are very high. The risk is that some firm is no more able to fulfill its
production plans and to pay back its debt. Figure 5 shows that during the recession
starting at month 130, some firms go into insolvency bankruptcy much earlier
than month 168. It is worth reminding here that insolvency bankruptcy (where
firms have negative equity) implies a partial write-off of debt that clearly affects
banks equity. See the paragraph about “financing” in Section 2 for more details
on bankruptcies in the model. These first bankruptcies do not affect seriously
banks equity, as shown in Figure 3, because of the small size of firms involved.
However, the chain of bankruptcies happening around month 168 determines a
strong reduction in banks equity. This equity fall seriously cuts the lending capacity
of the banking system. Capital requirement is no more fulfilled, banks have to
reduce new loans issuing, and firms are inevitably rationed in the credit market.
The immediate outcome is a chain of illiquidity bankruptcies, affecting firms that
still have a positive equity but that are unable to roll-over debt. As described in
Section 4, banks react stopping dividends payment and limiting new loans (because
constrained by low equity). These measures allow banks equity to raise for a
while. The production sector manages to recover from the output crash, but it is
only a matter of time. A second round of insolvency bankruptcies, at month 190,
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triggers a new crisis with a fall of banks equity that totally cuts credit supply, with
devastating consequences for the real economy (see Figure 2). The shortage of
credit starts a quick downward deleveraging path, represented in Figure 4, that
clearly signals the inability of firms to finance production.
Figure 7 shows the dynamics of the monetary aggregate in the Eurace economy
for the three different values of αs considered. The Eurace monetary aggregate
is defined as the sum of all private (i.e., held by households and firms) and public
(i.e., held by the Government and the Central Bank) deposits plus aggregate banks’
equity. It is worth noting that, with respect to the standard definition of monetary
aggregates, we include also the aggregate banks’ equity in the definition. This
choice allows to consider a more appropriate measure of the monetary aggregate
in the Eurace economy because banks’ equity can become negative, as it actually
happens in the case of α = 9 (see the bottom part of Figure 3) and there is
no mechanism of government bailout or of recapitalization of banks. If these
mechanisms would be in place, aggregate banks’ equity would be prevented to
become negative at the expense of government and/or households liquidity and
the monetary aggregate, defined in the standard way, would be lower accordingly.
Therefore, it is important to include also aggregate banks’ equity here to account
for this feature.
The results showed in Figure 7 is in line with the previous analysis, showing
that the monetary aggregate grows faster for higher αs in the first part of the
simulation, due to the lower capital requirement requested to banks. The trend
of the monetary aggregate clearly resembles the one of banks loans, because new
loans “create” new deposits in the sense explained by endogenous money theory,
see e.g. Fontana (2003). However, in the long run we observe that for high α the
monetary aggregate falls, as a consequence of the debt deleveraging effect. For
further details about the identity between the Eurace monetary aggregate on one
side and the credit money created by commercial banks, plus fiat money created
by central banks, on the other side, we invite the reader to refer to Cincotti et al.
(2010).
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7.2 Banks leverage impact
Section 7.1 presented an interpretation of the economic dynamics of the model,
trying to underline the mechanism triggering the crisis. Aim of the current section is
to analyze the impact of bank leverage ruling on the economic system performance.
In order to do that, we compare five different level of banks leverage, or capital
requirement, from α = 5 to α = 9. In Section 4, model details about the banking
system are available.
In Figure 3 it is shown that in the first part of the simulation, let’s say in the
first 4 years (48 months), the amount of total loans is higher for higher leverage.
Figure 2 shows that a larger amount of credit corresponds to higher production
and lower unemployment in the first 4 years. It is also worth noting that, in the
first part of the simulation, there is a significative difference in firms leverage (see
Figure 4), i.e., firms debt over equity is much higher in the case of higher allowed
banks leverage. A more robust version of these findings can be observed in Table
6 (Tables 6 to 12 are in the Appendix), where average results of 15 simulation
batteries are presented. Table results clearly confirm that the short term effect
of an higher amount of credit money injection into the artificial economy is an
improvement of real economic indicators, accompanied by a significant increase
in firms’ leverage. Figures 1 and 6 bring out that inflation increases with credit
money and that, consequently, interest rates also raise.
Some small signals of the higher financial fragility of firms exist also in the first
4 years of simulation. Figure 5 shows that some illiquidity bankruptcies are present
in the case of α = 9. There is also a downturn of production, but the recovery is
quick and the output is overall much higher for high αs, as clearly stated by Table
6.
As it became clear in the simulation paths analyzed in Section 7.1, the picture
changes when considering the long run, i.e., 20 years of simulation. Tables from 7
to 9 in the Appendix show the main economic variables of the model in the usual
range for α . Each value is averaged over 15 different random seed. To begin with,
it can be useful to have a look at Table 7, where the financial variables are reported.
It comes to light the stronger financial pressure and instability when banks’ capital
requirement is loose (high α). High interest rates and high firms’ debt provoke
chains of insolvency and illiquidity bankruptcies, as explained in Section 7.1,
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triggering an economic crisis. It is worth noting that the total outstanding credit
(Table 8) is no more increasing monotonically with α , as in the first 4 years,
because of the reduced banks’ equity that prevents loans supply.
The presented tables show quite clearly that there is a proper banks leverage
level around the value α = 7. For lower values firms are not able to accede to a
sufficient amount of credit, while for higher values firms debt load is too big and
triggers bankruptcies that destabilize the economy. This is visible looking at Table
9 where all the real indicators have an optimum value for α = 7. In particular,
one can notice that the difference among average GDP6 levels at low values of
α , i.e. α ≤ 7, is mainly given by differences in investment levels. This feature
can be observed also in Table 10, representing the crosscorrelation between credit
variations and investment variations, and Table 11, representing the crosscorrelation
between credit variations and production variations. Correlation is positive and
statistically significative in both cases, but much stronger in the case of investments.
This explains why the rising amount of loans in the economy (from α = 5 to α = 7)
affects investments more than production. We can analyze this fact in the light of
the financing mechanism described in Section 2. If firms can finance with their
revenues the wage bill, interest on debt, and capital depreciation, they do not need
any extra credit to carry on production. However, in order to raise their capital
level, through new investments, they need more loans from banks. This can be
verified looking at the relation between loans and investments in Figures 2, 1 and 3.
The last detail concerns the causal relation between credit, consumption and
investments. Observing the lag structure of Tables 10 and 11 it emerges that
production drives loans and loans drive investments. This is probably given by
the fact that firms determine their production plans according to recent sales, and
therefore loans demand increases when sales and production are high. On the other
hand, investments are possible only when there is a rise of loans, and new credit
money available. This causal relation is obviously less evident in the case of high
leverage (α = 9) because economic instability weakens, and sometimes breaks,
this kind of dynamics.
6 That is the sum of production and investments.
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Moreover, these outcomes attest that results presented in Teglio et al. (in press)
are still valid in an enriched setting where the policy rate is endogenously set and
affects firm’s investments in capital goods.
Finally, it is worth noting that the main results are robust with respect to
an increase of the agents’ number. In particular, we performed a new series of
simulations with an enlarged set of agents, where the number of households has
been raised to 5000 from the previous 2000, the number of firms is now 50 instead
of 20, while the number of banks has been increased from 3 to 7. Table 12 presents
the ensemble averages over 5 different random seeds of the relevant economic
variables, as presented already in Table 6 for the previous agents’ setting. The
ensemble averages are reported both for the first 4 years (48 months) and for the
whole period of 20 years (240 months). We can notice for high values of α (high
leverage) the boom-bust cycle already observed in the previous setting, i.e., an
initial credit-fueled boom in the high leverage case that however in the long-run
transforms into a burst and then into an economic depression. Furthermore, we
point out that, as in the previous case with a lower number of agents, the setting
with α = 7 provide the best economic welfare, as evidenced by the average levels
during the whole period of real economic variables.
Concluding remarks
The paper presented the agent-based macroeconomic model and simulator Eurace,
along with a set of computational experiments focused on endogenous boom-bust
credit cycles and their interplay with the business cycle. Different boom-bust
credit dynamics have been simulated by exogenously setting the regulatory capital
requirements for banks, mimicking the Basel II capital adequacy rules. Results
show that the debt accumulation by the corporate sector is able to foster economic
growth in the short run, but excessive leverage of the private sector may cause
waves of bankruptcies, credit rationing and significant GDP drops in the long run.
Credit-fueled economic booms put pressure on wages and labor costs. This, in
conjunction with the speed of growth of credit-money, causes a rise of inflation, that
in turn increases interest rates. Excessively indebted firms may soon be unable to
fulfill their financial commitments with the cash proceedings of their revenues, and
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may be obliged to take new loans to pay interest on their debt, therefore entering
in a Ponzi scheme. However, the deterioration of firms creditworthiness causes a
further rise of interest rates due to the widening of the risk spread on policy rates.
This further deteriorates the balance sheet of highly indebted firms, which may
become soon insolvent. Debt write-offs reduce banks’s equity and their lending
capacity, thus causing a widespread credit rationing and a forced deleveraging of
the corporate sector that may trigger a possible wave of bankruptcies of even good
but illiquid firms. A credit-fueled economic boom may turn out in a depression.
The relevance of the computational results reside in their resemblance with
the recent developments of advanced economies, which have been characterized
first by period of easy credit and high growth, then by a nearly collapse of the
financial system and a severe economic recession that ended in a slow recovery,
characterized by a prolonged period of deleveraging. Two major conclusions can
therefore be drawn form our results. First, debt and private sector leverage play
a crucial role in the business cycles dynamics and can not be neglected anymore
in any complete macroeconomic model. Second, it can be argued that the Eurace
model and simulator can be considered as a reliable scientific environment and
a useful computational facility where to investigate some of the most important
economic problems of present days. In this respect, future research efforts will
focus on the calibration of the Eurace simulation environment on examples of real
economies as case studies, and on the investigation of proper monetary and fiscal
policies able to prevent or at least mitigate the effects of a boom-bust credit cycle.
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Appendix
Tables
consumption goods unemployment total loans firms’
α production rate (%) outstanding leverage
5.0 8386 (48) 30.84 (0.58) 146424 (500) 1.19 (0.01)
6.0 9154 (109) 23.24 (1.15) 173790 (1837) 1.55 (0.02)
7.0 9800 (65) 15.48 (0.58) 196693 (1091) 2.00 (0.03)
8.0 10096 (53) 10.88 (0.67) 208303 (1376) 2.41 (0.03)
9.0 10159 (64) 9.80 (0.78) 216077 (1298) 2.69 (0.03)
Table 6: Values of relevant economic variables during the first 4 years (48 months) of simulation, for
different banks’ leverage levels (α). Values are averaged over 15 different random seeds (standard
errors are in brackets).
interest firms’ illiquidity insolvency
α rate (%) leverage bankruptcies bankruptcies
5.0 6.67 (0.15) 1.94 (0.96) 17.7 (2.5) 0.5 (0.2)
6.0 7.83 (0.29) 1.47 (0.14) 12.7 (1.7) 1.3 (0.3)
7.0 9.97 (0.23) 2.14 (0.25) 17.3 (2.3) 2.7 (0.7)
8.0 16.06 (1.78) 2.56 (0.14) 71.0 (19.9) 8.3 (1.7)
9.0 18.24 (1.29) 5.28 (0.79) 99.1 (13.3) 13.1 (1.0)
Table 7: Ensemble averages of the values of financial variables for different banks’ leverage levels
(α) during the whole duration of the simulation (20 years). Values are averaged over 15 different
random seeds (standard errors are in brackets).
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banks’ total loans price wage
α equity index index
5.0 67491 (2476) 459736 (10202) 0.83 (0.01) 2.82 (0.04)
6.0 77698 (5416) 543180 (21367) 0.92 (0.02) 3.07 (0.06)
7.0 90412 (3292) 652317 (17922) 1.05 (0.01) 3.33 (0.03)
8.0 27038 (23646) 599194 (43341) 1.16 (0.03) 3.23 (0.09)
9.0 14998 (20914) 620504 (35786) 1.19 (0.02) 3.14 (0.05)
Table 8: Nominal variables values for different banks’ leverage levels (α) during the whole duration
of the simulation (20 years). Values are averaged over 15 different random seeds (standard errors are
in brackets).
consumption goods investments goods real GDP unemployment
α production production level rate (%)
5.0 15165 (60) 4641 (149) 19807 (160) 7.88 (0.24)
6.0 15541 (46) 5106 (139) 20647 (172) 5.76 (0.34)
7.0 15547 (98) 5484 (115) 21031 (131) 4.59 (0.29)
8.0 13335 (801) 4211 (503) 17546 (1293) 12.50 (3.39)
9.0 12048 (467) 3377 (336) 15425 (789) 16.01 (1.93)
Table 9: Ensemble averages of real variables values for different banks’ leverage levels (α) during
the whole duration of the simulation (20 years). Values are averaged over 15 different random seeds
(standard errors are in brackets).
α lag -2 lag -1 lag 0 lag 1 lag 2
5.0 0.33 (0.01) 0.44 (0.01) 0.54 (0.01) 0.62 (0.02) 0.67 (0.02)
6.0 0.34 (0.01) 0.43 (0.01) 0.52 (0.01) 0.59 (0.01) 0.64 (0.02)
7.0 0.35 (0.00) 0.42 (0.01) 0.48 (0.01) 0.53 (0.01) 0.57 (0.01)
8.0 0.43 (0.03) 0.48 (0.02) 0.53 (0.02) 0.57 (0.02) 0.59 (0.02)
9.0 0.45 (0.02) 0.48 (0.02) 0.52 (0.02) 0.55 (0.02) 0.56 (0.02)
Table 10: Ensemble averages of crosscorrelation values between monthly percentage variations of
total credit and of investment goods production (the lagged variable). The lag represents 1 month.
The time period of reference is the whole duration of the simulation (years).
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α lag -2 lag -1 lag 0 lag 1 lag 2
5.0 0.26 (0.02) 0.25 (0.02) 0.21 (0.03) 0.16 (0.04) 0.11 (0.04)
6.0 0.33 (0.03) 0.33 (0.03) 0.31 (0.04) 0.26 (0.04) 0.22 (0.04)
7.0 0.34 (0.04) 0.34 (0.05) 0.31 (0.05) 0.27 (0.05) 0.22 (0.05)
8.0 0.15 (0.06) 0.15 (0.06) 0.15 (0.06) 0.14 (0.05) 0.12 (0.05)
9.0 0.04 (0.05) 0.03 (0.05) 0.05 (0.04) 0.06 (0.04) 0.05 (0.04)
Table 11: Ensemble averages of crosscorrelation values between monthly percentage variations of
total credit and of consumption goods production (the lagged variable). The lag represents 1 month.
The time period of reference is the whole duration of the simulation (years).
consum. goods unemployment total loans firms’α months
production rate (%) outstanding leverage
1 - 48 16402 (350) 44.94 (1.46) 326871 (1970) 1.21 (0.00)5
1 - 240 23515 (843) 35.32 (1.83) 603579 (20897) 0.55 (0.01)
1 - 48 18093 (322) 37.87 (1.21) 378670 (2681) 1.51 (0.01)6
1 - 240 23645 (1635) 34.73 (3.23) 743146 (76516) 0.69 (0.02)
1 - 48 20774 (137) 27.51 (0.54) 436695 (4008) 1.77 (0.03)7
1 - 240 32316 (2316) 16.50 (4.32) 1435614 (195845) 1.44 (0.33)
1 - 48 22739 (650) 18.73 (2.46) 488226 (8330) 2.14 (0.04)8
1 - 240 28768 (4071) 17.66 (5.09) 1470094 (353858) 2.11 (0.33)
1 - 48 23128 (297) 16.80 (1.36) 513106 (2419) 2.44 (0.03)9
1 - 240 19092 (2891) 37.35 (4.88) 902814 (276803) 3.31 (0.66)
Table 12: New enlarged set of agents (5000 households, 50 firms and 7 banks). Ensemble averages
of the values of relevant economic variables are reported both the first 4 years (48 months) and the
whole duration of simulation. Values are averaged over 5 different random seeds (standard errors are
in brackets).
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Figure 1: Simulation paths for inflation, central bank interest rate, and investments. Three values of
banks leverage α are considered, i.e., α = 5 (black line), α = 7 (blue line) and α = 9 (red line).
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Figure 2: Simulation paths for production and unemployment. Three values of banks leverage α are
considered, i.e., α = 5 (black line), α = 7 (blue line) and α = 9 (red line).
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Figure 3: Simulation paths for total outstanding loans (credit) and banks aggregate equity. Three
values of banks leverage α are considered, i.e., α = 5 (black line), α = 7 (blue line) and α = 9 (red
line).
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Figure 4: Simulation paths for firms’ financial indicators (debt over equity and interest expenditures
over revenues). Three values of banks leverage α are considered, i.e., α = 5 (black line), α = 7
(blue line) and α = 9 (red line).
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Figure 5: Monthly number of insolvency and illiquidity bankruptcies. Three values of banks leverage
α are considered, i.e., α = 5 (black line), α = 7 (blue line) and α = 9 (red line).
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Figure 6: Simulation paths for price and wage indexes. Three values of banks leverage α are
considered, i.e., α = 5 (black line), α = 7 (blue line) and α = 9 (red line).
www.economics-ejournal.org 48
conomics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal
0 24 48 72 96 120 144 168 192 216 240
0
5
10
15
x 105
months
Ag
gr
ea
te
 p
riv
at
e 
an
d 
pu
bl
ic 
se
ct
or
 d
ep
os
its
Figure 7: Simulation paths for the monetary aggregate of the model. Three values of banks leverage
α are considered, i.e., α = 5 (black line), α = 7 (blue line) and α = 9 (red line).
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